Life Estates

Here is a working definition of the life estate: According to Prof. Moynihan, a "life estate" is "an estate which is not terminable at any fixed or computable period and has its duration measured by the life or lives of one or more persons."

No magic words are necessary so long as the intention to create a life estate is expressed.

Thus, Grutz conveys “To John Walton for his life.”

Walton has a life estate measured by his own life. The life estate terminates on John walton’s death. What happens to Blackacre?

The property reverts to Grutz who retained a Reversion in Fee Simple Absolute when he created the life estate.

Alternatively, a grantor may create a life estate in a person for the life of another, i.e. an estate pur autre vie. See chart on p. 253.

Thus, Grutz conveys Blackacre “To John Walton for the life of Lady Gaga.”

Walton has a life estate pur autre vie, one which will terminate with the death of Gaga.

What happens to Blackacre if Walton dies and Lady Gaga is still alive?

May Walton provide for the unexpired portion of his life estate in his will? If he dies intestate will it pass to his heirs?

Yes! Even though life estates were not inheritable at common law, today an unexpired life estate may pass to the owner’s successors either by will or intestate distribution.

Notice also that a life estate is freely alienable by deed.

Suppose Grutz conveys "to John Walton for his life." What happens when Walton conveys his life estate to Katy Perry? What does Katy Perry have?

A life estate can also be created in a way that it will be cut short upon the happening of a stated event. Suppose Grutz conveys to the widow of his friend, John Q Public:

 “To Mrs. Public for her life or until she remarries.”

What does Mrs. Public have?

She has a life estate determinable: i.e. the life estate will terminate upon her death unless she remarries (in which case it will terminate upon her remarriage).

Okay, let’s suppose Grutz conveys “To Duncan for his life.” What happens to the property when I die?

Assuming Grutz had a fee simple absolute, when I die the property reverts to Grutz and he has his fee simple absolute back again.

What the Grantor does not convey, he retains. So the state of the title is Duncan life estate, Grutz reversion in fee simple absolute.

But suppose Grutz makes the following conveyance: “To Duncan for life, then to Schutz and his heirs.”

What is the state of the title now?

Duncan has a life estate

Schutz has a remainder in fee simple absolute

Upon my death, Schutz’s future interest (his remainder) becomes possessory and Schutz has a Fee Simple Absolute.

What if Schutz dies before me?

Now his remainder in fee simple absolute will pass in accordance with his will or to his heirs if he dies intestate.

So, if Schutz’s will left all his property to Dean Moberly, upon Schutz’s death Moberly becomes the owner of Schutz’s remainder in fee simple absolute.

 

Lewis v. Searles: A Few Notes

     

                                      Miss Havisham with Pip and Estella (Great Expectations)


Here is a working definition of the life estate: According to Prof. Moynihan, a "life estate" is "an estate which is not terminable at any fixed or computable period and has its duration measured by the life or lives of one or more persons."

Typical examples of life estates include:

1. Grutz "to Duncan for his life"

2. Grutz "to Duncan for the life of Schutz"

Now here are some possibilities concerning Lewis v. Searles:

Life Estate: To Hattie for life, then to Hattie, Letitia and James and their heirs.

Fee Simple:To Hattie and her heirs.

Life estate Determinable:To Hattie for her life so long as she remains unmarried, then to H, L & J and their heirs.

Fee Simple Determinable:To Hattie and her heirs so long as she remains unmarried, then to H, L & J and their heirs.

The Actual Will:To Hattie so long as she remains single and unmarried, and if she marries, to H, L & J in equal shares.

The actual devise is neither clearly a life estate determinable nor clearly a fee simple determinable. Thus, the statutory default rule presumes that Hattie took a fee simple determinable.

Query:  How would you have drafted the bequest to Hattie L. Lewis in the will of Letitia Lewis?

Here are some important passages from the court's opinion:

 

Here is what the will provides (p.269)

Paragraph “Second” of the will was as follows: “Second, I devise to my niece, Hattie L. Lewis, all of my real and personal property of which I may die seized and possessed, so long as she remains single and unmarried. In the event that the said Hattie L. Lewis shall marry, then and in this event I desire that all of my property, both real and personal be divided equally between my nieces and nephews as follows, to the said Hattie L. Lewis, an undivided one third, to Letitia A. LaForge, wife of A.C. LaForge, an undivided one third, and to James R. Lewis an undivided one third.” This is the only part in controversy.

Is this clause well-drafted? Should the lawyer who drafted it be proud of his work?

 So, what is the issue about this provision in the will of Letitia Lewis?

 Plaintiff’s Position (p. 269):

She further alleged: that she had never been married; that she received an estate in fee under the will; that the restriction in the will against marriage was void.

Defendant’s position (p. 269-70):

they prayed [prayed? should we pray to courts and judges!!] that title in fee to an undivided one third of the land be quieted in each of them under the terms of the will, subject to a life estate in plaintiff.

So, who is right? Did the will create a life estate determinable or a fee simple determinable?

What controls this issue? See p. 272, 274

Thus, upon Hattie’s death, the future interest fails and Hattie’s Fee Simple Determinable becomes a Fee Simple absolute (since she will never marry) and her heirs take the entire Fee Simple Absolute. So, if Hattie’s will left all her property to me, I would take the Fee Simple and the other niece and nephew would take nothing.

What do you think was the intent of the Testator, Letitia Lewis? Do you think the Testator loved Hattie more than the other cousins?

What about Hattie’s argument that “that all provisions of the will concerning the marriage of plaintiff are void as against public policy and should be stricken.”

P. 270: The author of the A.L.R. Annotation says that “The preponderance of modern opinion seems to be that the right of a donor to attach such conditions as he pleases to his gift will outweigh the maxim that marriage should be free, except where such conditions are evidently attached through caprice rather than from a desire to carry out a reasonable purpose.” (Loc. cit. 11-12.) The history of this most ancient rule is discussed in that Annotation. It is obvious that the cases on the subject are both conflicting and confusing, but that most, if not all, courts still give lip service to the doctrine. The tendency, however, is to consider whether, under the circumstances, the provision serves a legitimate purpose. And one reason which the author mentions as most commonly applied is the desire to furnish support to the devisee while single.

So, what was Letitia’s purpose when she drafted the will as she did? Why didn’t she just give Hattie, James, and Letitia LaForge equal shares of a Fee Simple?

See p. 271: intent of the testator to provide support for the plaintiff while she remained unmarried but, upon the happening of such a contingency, to require that she share with the other niece and the nephew. The provision did not constitute a penalty for marrying. This provision was obviously not inserted by whim or “caprice,” for plaintiff was not to be cut off if she did marry. We conclude that the provision of the will concerning marriage was valid.

But if her purpose was simply to provide extra support for Hattie "while she remained unmarried" otherwise to share equally, doesn't this suggest that the testator;s intent was to give Hatiie a life estate determinable, not a fee simple determinable?

But that statute still governs.