
Let's read this recent case for next week as per the list of assignments. UPDATE The link on the list of assignments for this case is a good link. Use that one.
Here is a link to a video of the battle for the ball!
This is the web log for Professor Duncan's Property Class at Nebraska Law. Rugged individualism and liberty are inseparable: “There can be no liberty unless there is economic liberty.” — Margaret Thatcher "We didn't love freedom enough. We purely and simply deserved everything that happened afterward." -Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn "This is America, we don't share land here." John Dutton Yellowstone




"Court Upholds Curbs on Signs in New Jersey": The New York Times on Friday will contain an article that begins, "In a ruling that could have implications far beyond New Jersey, the State Supreme Court on Thursday upheld the right of homeowners' associations to restrict the posting of political signs and other forms of constitutionally protected speech,as long as the restrictions are not 'unreasonable or oppressive.'"
You can access today's ruling of the Supreme Court of New Jersey at this link.Query? Why isn't it always unreasonable for a HOA to restrict a homeowner's constitutionally protected expression on her own property?
In Euless, Texas, the city has moved to dismiss a RLUIPA suit brought against it by a Santeria priest who who was refused a permit to sacrifice animals at his home in a religious ceremony. (See prior posting.) The city ordinance permits the slaughter of chickens so long as they are used for food. But it would not permit the slaughtering of goats that Santeria priest, Jose Merced, and his followers were preparing to do. According to yesterday's Dallas Morning News, the city claims that its law prohibiting the slaughtering of animals anywhere in the city is a health and safety law, not a "land use" regulation covered by RLUIPA. RLUIPA, Sec. 8(5), defines a "land use regulation" as "a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land)".

Professor Hilgartner said patents don’t just determine who will own new technologies and who has access to them. They also influence what technologies cost, whose cultural and ethical values they represent, and what aspects of the research and development process will be transparent — and to whom.
The degree of control that life patents grant their owners is of growing concern to scientists, human rights and patient advocates and ethicists. More than 20 percent of human genes have already been patented, and most of those patents are owned by corporations.
Professor Hilgartner noted how this kind of control can play out in the real world. In the case of the Canavan disease patent, for example, a family afflicted by this rare genetic disorder initiated an effort to find the gene mutation responsible for the disease. They raised money, collected DNA samples and attracted researchers to the cause.
After a researcher found the gene in the late 1990s, he and his employer, Miami Children’s Hospital, patented it and began charging royalties on a genetic test to screen for the disease — despite the fact that they would never have found the gene without the efforts and the DNA samples of the afflicted.
Patient groups filed suit in 2000, contending misappropriation of trade secrets by using their children’s DNA without consent to obtain a patent. It took until 2003 for the parties to reach a confidential settlement; it allows certain laboratories to continue collecting royalties but lets institutions, doctors and scientists use the patented gene sequences without paying.
There are many other examples of life patents causing public concern. One of the most important examples involves patents on food crops and cloned animals. These patents have a growing potential to cede control of the world’s food supply to biotech patent holders.
“Everybody thinks landlords are bad and we can steal from them,” said Mr. Frankel, a helicopter door gunner in Vietnam who later worked in the garment center and can still spot a tailor-made suit by the sleeve buttons alone. “We live in a life of double standards. We have all these great people who go to work, donate to charities, talk about how the war is horrible — but everybody still thinks it’s O.K. to have the Robin Hood mentality.”
Today's Courier News reports that in Elgin, Illinois, HELPS Ministry, the operator of a downtown homeless shelter, has filed suit in federal court claiming that the city has violated HELPS' free exercise rights and its rights under RLUIPA. The suit alleges that the city has indefinitely delayed a vote on granting it a conditional use permit to reopen its shelter at Family Life Church after the facility had been closed down for code violations that made it unsafe for overnight occupancy. The city's zoning board voted unanimously to recommend the permit, but before the Nov. 29, 2006 City Council meeting at which the recommendation was to be approved, the item was removed from the agenda "and sent to the city's legal department indefinitely." Since it was forced out of Family Life, HELPS has provided sleeping space for the homeless on its school bus, at various churches and at a Christian camp.
Of all the places that sexual predators could end up after prison, the worst is out of sight, away from the scrutiny and treatment that could prevent them from committing new crimes. But communities around the country are taking that risk, with zoning laws that banish pedophiles to the literal edges of society.
There is a powerful and wholly understandable impulse behind laws that forbid sex offenders to live within certain distances of schools, day care centers and other places that children gather. Scores of states and municipalities have created such buffer zones, then continued adding layer upon layer to the enforcement blanket.
This has placed a heavy burden on law enforcement agencies, which already must struggle to meet exacting federal and state requirements for registering and monitoring the ever-growing population of released sex offenders, many of whom must be tracked for life. Lawmakers have shown no hesitation in piling on the administrative load, but frequently are less quick to pay for additional people to do the work.
As the areas off limits to sex offenders expand to encompass entire towns and cities, if not states, the places where they can live and work are shrinking fast. The unintended consequence is that offenders have been dispersed to rural nowhere zones, where they are much harder to track. In confined regions like Long Island, they have become concentrated in a handful of low-rent, few-questions-asked areas — an unintended and unfair imposition on their wary neighbors.
Many offenders respond by going underground. In Iowa, the number of registered sex offenders who went missing soared after the state passed a law forbidding offenders to live within 2,000 feet of a school or day care center. The county prosecutors’ association has urged that the law be repealed, for the simple reasons that it drives offenders out of sight, requires “the huge draining of scant law enforcement resources” and doesn’t provide the protection intended.
The prosecutors are right that any sense of security that such laws provide is vague at best and probably false. Just as it would feel foolish to forbid muggers to live near A.T.M.’s, it is hard to imagine how a 1,000-foot buffer zone around a bus stop, say, would keep a determined pedophile at bay. If children feel secure enough to drop their wariness of strangers, that would be a dangerous outcome. And of course, no buffer against a faceless predator will be any help to the overwhelming majority of child victims — those secretly abused by stepfathers, uncles and other people they know.
The problem with residency restrictions is that they fulfill an emotional need but not a rational one. It’s in everyone’s interest for registered sex offenders to lead stable lives, near the watchful eyes of family and law enforcement and regular psychiatric treatment. Exile by zoning threatens to create just the opposite phenomenon — a subpopulation of unhinged nomads off their meds with no fixed address and no one keeping tabs on them. This may satisfy many a town’s thirst for retributive justice, but as a sensible law enforcement policy designed to make children safer, it smacks of thoughtlessness and failure.
6th Circuit Awards Attorneys' Fees In RLUIPA Case
Yesterday in DiLaura v. Township of Ann Arbor, (6th Cir., Dec. 27, 2006), the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with plaintiffs in a RLUIPA case that they were "prevailing parties" and were entitled to $178,535 in attorneys fees, rejecting the district court's lower award. In the underlying case, the Apostolate for the Eucharistic Life challenged the Township's refusal to grant a zoning variance so it could operate a bed and breakfast that hosted guests without charge for prayer and contemplation.
ALTHOUGH qualifying to rent an apartment in New York City is not yet as tough as winning admission to Harvard or Yale, it increasingly feels that way to a large contingent of aspiring tenants — even if they actually attended Harvard or Yale and easily passed muster with their previous landlord.
Among the 50,000 background checks run this year on Manhattan tenants by On-Site.com, a national background-checking and leasing service used by some landlords and managing agents, fully 41 percent of applicants garnered a rating of either “reject” or “maybe” (21 and 20 percent respectively).
That means a fifth of would-be renters are being shown a different door than they had hoped, while another fifth struggle to upgrade their conditional status.
With paychecks lagging behind the 10 to 15 percent rent increases for market-rate apartments over the last year, many more would-be tenants fail to scale the standard annual income threshold of 40 to 45 times the monthly rent.
That means that if you want to rent a studio for $2,000 a month, you need to earn $80,000 to $90,000 a year (much higher figures, by the way, than the 36 times the monthly rent required in the rest of the country).
Renters who flunk the income test must prove themselves in other ways. Landlords are demanding extra cash up front, solid credit records and local guarantors who earn around twice the income threshold and are willing to bare their finances to both strangers and kin. Even then, a history of litigation against a prior landlord usually triggers automatic disqualification.
When you are a regular customer at a given restaurant, developing a reputation as a good tipper presumably results in better service, while developing a reputation as a lousy tipper presumably results in an increased frequency of "spitters." In contrast, using our recent trip to Hawaii as an illustration, I noted that when one will only interact with a waiter once (or are interacting for the last time), it's economically irrational to tip. After all, you'll never be back, so there's no chance for better service but there's also no risk of a spitter. As I put it, in a one time or final period setting, a hard-hearted economically rational actor wouldn't tip.
Those Who Favor Income Redistribution Are Less Happy and Less Generous.--
Last fall and winter, I circulated a paper on the relationship of people’s views on income redistribution and capitalism to traditional racism and to intolerance for unpopular groups. I presented it to Gary Becker’s and Dick Posner’s Rational Choice Workshop at the University of Chicago and to the Law, Economics, and Organization Workshop at Yale.
With the publication of Arthur C. Brooks’ new book Who Really Cares (tip for the news story to Instapundit), which presents data showing that conservatives tend to be more generous than non-conservatives, I decided to put a full PDF copy of my paper on SSRN. It appears that our analyses directly overlap only slightly, though they are certainly generally complementary.
In the field of social psychology, it is commonly believed that people support capitalism and oppose greater income redistribution because they are racist or want to dominate other people or groups. Indeed, a study of college students in the United States and secondary students in Sweden found that attitudes supporting capitalism were positively associated with racism and an orientation toward social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). In my draft article I expand and test this thesis using 16 nationally representative General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center between 1980 and 2004.
In later posts, I will discuss my main results, but in this post I want to confirm one of Brooks’ findings (in chapter 3 of his book)--those who oppose greater government income redistribution tend to give much more to charity. What follows is a shortened version of one small section of my paper (the paper includes relevant charts).
Ten states pass anti-Kelo referendum initiatives:
During this fall's elections, voters in twelve states considered anti-Kelo referendum initiatives that sought to ban or curtail the condemnation of private property in order to promote "economic development." Ten of the twelve passed, all by lopsided margins ranging from 55% to 86% of the vote. For a complete list, see here.
The only two anti-Kelo initiatives that failed were proposals in California and Idaho that were tied to complex and highly controversial "regulatory takings" proposals which would have required the government to compensate landowners whenever the value of their property is reduced by various types of government regulations; a stand-alone regulatory takings initiative was also defeated in the state of Washington. Tying anti-Kelo referenda to the much less popular regulatory takings referenda has turned out to be a serious political mistake.
More importantly, of the ten anti-Kelo initiatives that passed, at least six (Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota, and Oregon) and possibly seven (counting Michigan) are well enough worded to provide strong protection to property owners that would succeed in banning all or most economic development takings in those states. This is a much better batting average than that of post-Kelo reforms enacted by state legislatures, most of which tend to provide little or no protection for property owners (see, e.g., my analysis here, here, and here, and Tim Sandefur's excellent article on the subject).
Why are the anti-Kelo referendum initiatives so much more effective than most of their legislative cousins? I suspect because the former are usually drafted by property rights activists rather than by state legislators. As I discuss in more detail in the posts linked above, politicians often have incentives to give voters the impression that they are "reforming" eminent domain without actually doing so. Activist groups have few if any such incentives and the reforms they draft are therefore likely to have fewer loopholes and be more effective in eliminating economic development takings.

NEXT MONTH, in 12 states, including California, voters will get a rare chance to talk back to the Supreme Court. Those are the states with measures on their ballots to protect property rights, sparked by the court's 2005 Kelo decision, which lets government condemn a person's property and give it to someone else who can make "better use" of it. In an instant, Americans across the country woke up to the realization that, as Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote in dissent, "The specter of condemnation hangs over all property."
To date, 30 states have enacted measures to restrain their power to condemn, and citizens have stepped in where legislatures have balked, placing initiatives on the ballots. Despite intense opposition from the powers who benefit from the status quo, these initiatives are doing well in the polls because they're tapping into a bedrock American principle: the right of everyone to own and enjoy property.
Western conservatives are gunning for the judiciary this election year with a half-dozen ballot measures that would rope in the authority of what they describe as activist judges.
Case in point is Colorado, where former state Senate leader John Andrews tried for years to solve the problem of activist judges who he said routinely legislated from the bench, often at the expense of conservatives.
His efforts in the legislature fell short, but Mr. Andrews isn't finished. He is the prime mover behind Amendment 40, a proposed constitutional amendment that would limit state appellate judges to 10-year terms, making Colorado the first state to limit the office of top-tier judges.
"We see a pattern of ideological and political decisions from the bench, and it points to a consistent tendency of appellate judges in Colorado to rewrite the law," said Mr. Andrews, now a fellow with the Claremont Institute, after a press conference yesterday at the state Capitol.

If you're interested in law and literature, you might find my website for the Law & Humanities Institute to contain some useful information.
There are several web pages that may be of interest:
1. General Resources (websites, syllabi, etc.)
2. A List of Literary Works About the Law
3. A Chronological Bibliography of Works About Law & Literature (1982-present)
4. A Bibliography of Law & Literature Scholarship About Particular Writers


39. “Property Line,” by The Marshall Tucker Band. ; buy CD on Amazon.comThe secret to happiness, according to these southern-rock heavyweights, is life, liberty, and property: “Well my idea of a good time / Is walkin’ my property line / And knowin’ the mud on my boots is mine.”
Barrels of ink have already been spilled over the Supreme Court's narrow 5-4 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, including some by yours truly. In "The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development Takings and Environmental Protection," environmental law professor Jonathan Adler and I have now put together the first article to systematically examine Kelo's implications for environmental policy. It is available here, and currently under review by journals.
We argue that the Supreme Court's decision to allow government to condemn property for transfer to other private parties in order to promote "economic development" may well harm the environment. In particular, private conservation land (an increasingly important tool for protecting environmental amenities and wildlife) is likely to be targeted for condemnation by developers and their allies in local government because conservation property contributes little to development and is usually not subject to property taxes. Allowing economic development condemnations also harms the environment in several indirect ways that we detail in the paper.
Some environmentalists fear that forbidding economic development takings would undermine the use of eminent domain for environmental purposes. Jonathan and I show that these fears are probably groundless. Not even the hint of such a trend has arisen in the nine states where economic development condemnations are banned by state constitutional law. And nearly all environmental takings can easily be justified under one of several legal rationales that would remain intact even if economic development takings are banned.
But a big draw for Timber Creek's 45 public-housing families is the mix of tenant incomes, allowing poor people to blend in and flourish in a suburban area where low-income people historically haven't settled.
"You have more role models here," said Patricia Gunther, a single mother who has lived there for four years. "People get up every morning. They go to work. They pay their rent."
Developments such as Timber Creek can provide some guidance as Omaha grapples with a concentration of poor and minority students in its eastern neighborhoods.
Both the Omaha school district, which has proposed absorbing suburban schools as an equalizer, and suburban school officials, who oppose such a move, say housing patterns have intensified school segregation.
Timber Creek, with its integrated environment, support services for residents and the nearby Holling Heights Elementary School, stands out as an example of how low-income families can thrive in suburbia.
Timber Creek is among only a dozen family-oriented Omaha complexes west of 72nd Street that operate under a government mandate guaranteeing at least some low-income units. The requirements stem from the developers' use of public subsidies, including federal tax credits, to help pay for construction or purchase.
In a rare display of unanimity that cuts across partisan and geographic lines, lawmakers in virtually every statehouse across the country are advancing bills and constitutional amendments to limit use of the government's power of eminent domain to seize private property for economic development purposes.
The measures are in direct response to the United States Supreme Court's 5-to-4 decision last June in a landmark property rights case from Connecticut, upholding the authority of the City of New London to condemn homes in an aging neighborhood to make way for a private development of offices, condominiums and a hotel. It was a decision that one justice, who had written for the majority, later all but apologized for.
The Oregon Supreme Court today reversed a lower court judgment that had invalidated Measure 37, the ballot initiative that requires compensation to be paid to landowners when land-use regulations reduce property values. The opinion is available here. The Oregonian also has a story on the opinion.
I've linked to recent essays on Measure 37 here and here. I've noted before that although I tend to be relatively pro-property rights on takings issues, I think Measure 37 is overbroad and a really bad idea. But the voter anger behind Measure 37 is real, and combined with the post-Kelo backlash should cause land-use planners to question whether consistently sticking it to property owners is a good long-term strategy. Oregon land-use planners probably wouldn't be facing potential disaster if they had made some modest accommodations to property owners' interests from the outset.
Roger Clegg: A Brief Dialogue on Judicial Activism
Central to the judicial nominations debate is the question of judicial activism. Through a series of questions and answers written for the Committee for Justice, Roger Clegg explains what types of decisions constitute judicial activism and why Americans from across the political spectrum should oppose it. Clegg is president of the Center for Equal Opportunity, a former high-ranking Justice Department official, and one of the nation's leading experts on civil rights law.
A BRIEF DIALOGUE ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
By Roger Clegg
Q. What is judicial activism?
A. Judicial activism is when a judge ignores what the text of the Constitution or some other law says and substitutes instead his own preference for what it ought to say. It can involve putting something into the text that isn't there, or taking out something that is there.
Q. Is it activism whenever a court strikes down a statute as unconstitutional?
A. Of course not. If a statute violates the Constitution, it would be judicial activism not to strike it down. Striking down a statute is judicial activism only if the statute really isn't inconsistent with the Constitution.
Q. Is it activism whenever a court overrules one of its own precedents?
A. Again, of course not. The principle of stare decisis - Latin for "Let the decision stand" - is a venerable one, and there are good reasons for courts not lightly to ignore their past rulings. But from time to time they do so, and it really doesn't make sense to call it judicial activism when they do. After all, how can overruling a decision that was itself activist be properly labeled activist?
Q. But don't liberals complain that the current Supreme Court is activist because it has struck down some federal statutes, and mightn't they complain that overruling a decision like Roe v. Wade is activist?
A. They have and they might, but in their heart they know this is a bogus claim.
Q. Okay, so judicial activism is just a court ignoring the text of a law and substituting its own policy preferences. But why is this a left-versus-right argument?
A. It shouldn't be. And, indeed, sometimes judicial activism has led to results that liberals would presumably dislike. Exhibit A is, of course, the infamous Dred Scott decision, where Chief Justice Taney made up a constitutional prohibition against Congress limiting the spread of slavery. At the present time, judicial activism is being used by the left in the culture wars, but it has not always been so, nor will it always be so.
Q. So, probably there are instances where conservatives would like for judges to bend the Constitution's text one way, and liberals would like to bend the text the other way. But why shouldn't this be part of what judges do? Put bluntly: What's wrong with judicial activism?
A. What you're asking is, "What's wrong with judges ignoring the Constitution?" and the answer is the same as the answer to "What's wrong with the President (or Congress) ignoring the Constitution?" Sure, in the short term the Constitution may thwart policies or outcomes that this group or that group might prefer. But in the long run the Constitution protects us all, and it is perilous to urge any of the three branches of government to ignore it.
Q. If it's all that simple, then why doesn't the left - and, especially, the pro-abortion folks who are so enamored of Roe v. Wade - see it?
A. Some of them may actually think a judge can find a right to abortion in the Constitution, but I think they are a minority, even on the left. My sense is that many feminists really see the right to abortion as such an important end that they are willing to protect it by any means necessary. You can't really reason with them. The best you can do is persuade some of the less extreme among them that (a) there's a good chance that even a conservative nominee these days will follow stare decisis with respect to Roe, (b) the overwhelming majority of states will continue to allow most abortions, even if Roe is overruled and, what's more, it will soon be essentially impossible to keep abortion pills out of the hands of women in, say, Utah and Louisiana, and (c) the left is playing with fire by giving five justices the power to rewrite the Constitution.
BB&T, the nation’s ninth largest financial holdings company with $109.2 billion in assets, announced today that it “will not lend to commercial developers that plan to build condominiums, shopping malls and other private projects on land taken from private citizens by government entities using eminent domain.”
In a press release issued today by the bank, BB&T Chairman and Chief Executive Officer John Allison, said, “The idea that a citizen’s property can be taken by the government solely for private use is extremely misguided, in fact it’s just plain wrong. One of the most basic rights of every citizen is to keep what they own. As an institution dedicated to helping our clients achieve economic success and financial security, we won’t help any entity or company that would undermine that mission and threaten the hard-earned American dream of property ownership.”
They have still not moved out. Not Susette Kelo. Not the Derys. Not Byron Athenian or Bill Von Winkle or the others.
Five months after the United States Supreme Court set off a national debate by ruling that the City of New London could seize their property through eminent domain to make way for new private development, no one has been forced to leave.
No bulldozers have arrived to level the last houses still standing, and none are expected soon.
Even though the holdouts lost their case, and the development that would displace them finally seems free to go forward, construction has not begun, and some elements of the project have been effectively paralyzed since the court ruling prompted a political outcry.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
A paralegal, an associate, and a partner of a prestigious New York law firm are walking through Central Park on their way to lunch when they find an antique oil lamp. They rub it and a genie comes out in a puff of smoke.
The genie says, "I usually only grant three wishes, so I'll give each of you just one."
"Me first! Me first!" says the paralegal. "I want to be in the Bahamas, driving a speedboat, without a care in the world."
Poof. He's gone.
"Me next! Me next!" says the associate in astonishment. "I want to be in Hawaii, relaxing on the beach with my personal masseuse, an endless supply of piña coladas, and the love of my life."
Poof. She's gone.
"You're next," the genie says to the partner.
The partner says, "I want those two back in the library after lunch."
Walter Williams on "Price Gouging":
The people's economist, Walter Williams, patiently explains once again why limits on "price gouging" are counterproductive (I noted Georgia's "crackdown" on price gouging a week or two ago):
The fallout from Hurricane Katrina has featured a lot of ignorance and demagoguery about prices. Let's look at some of it. One undeniable fact is that the hurricane disaster changed scarcity conditions. There are fewer stores, fewer units of housing, less gasoline and a shortage of many other goods and services used daily. Rising prices not only manifest these changed scarcity conditions, they help us cope, adjust and get us on the road to recovery.
Here's a which-is-better question for you. Suppose a hotel room rented for $79 a night prior to Hurricane Katrina's devastation. Based on that price, an evacuating family of four might rent two adjoining rooms. When they arrive at the hotel, they find the rooms rent for $200; they decide to make do with one room. In my book, that's wonderful. The family voluntarily opted to make a room available for another family who had to evacuate or whose home was destroyed. Demagogues will call this price-gouging, but I ask you, which is preferable: a room available at $200 or a room unavailable at $79? Rising prices get people to voluntarily economize on goods and services rendered scarcer by the disaster.
He also explains why the cost that the service stations paid when the bought the gasoline is simply irrelevant:
What about the house you might have bought for $50,000 in 1970 that you're selling today? If you charged me $250,000 for it, today's price for its replacement, as opposed to what you paid for it, are you guilty of price-gouging?